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It would seem, therefore, that the Erie Ry. v. Tompkins 75 case
will result in a divergence of views in the federal courts, a situation
which could not have arisen with the earlier doctrine. In its place,
however, there is the long-awaited advantage of consistency within
the realm of the particular state, and a single set of laws for the state,
with no possibility .of altering the legal result by a diversity of citizenship plea.
The broad principle on which the Swift doctrine 76, was based
may yet be attained. The principal reason for the Swift doctrine 7
was repeatedly stated to be that it would lead to uniformity among
the states when they all adopted the federal views. This result was
clearly not accomplished by a continuation of the doctrine. It would
seem, therefore, that other forces must be used to gain that desired
end, particularly the exchange of learning and the constant agitation
of bar associations throughout the country for the cause of uniformity
through action of state legislatures.
EDYTHE R. DUClcER.

CIRCULATION AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A FREE

PRESs.

In order to comprehend completely the scope of the question
under consideration here, it is essential to examine at some length the
significance of the phrase "freedom of the press", as the framers of
the First Amendment understood it.
I.
The constitutional guaranty of a free press is found, not in the
Constitution of the United States itself, but in the First Amendment
which reads:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances."
The generally recognized common law definition of the term
"freedom of the press" is that stated by Blackstone:1 "The liberty
" 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
7 Ibid.
14 BL. Commi.
151, 152. For state constitutions that have been influenced
by Blackstone's definition in wording their free press provisions see Index
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of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this

consists in laying no previous restraintsupon publications, and not in

freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. * * *" 2
(Italics ours.)
This definition,3 stressing the fact that freedom of the press consists solely in "laying no previous restraints upon publications", has
been, from our earliest history, the ,subject of much heated discussion
and bitter controversy by both the courts and the writers of legal
treatises. 4 Madison argued forcefully against the acceptance of the
Blackstonian theory." He said: 6 "In every state, probably, in the
Union, the press has exercised a freedom in canvassing the merits of
measures and public men of every description which has not been confined to the strict limits of the common law." (Italics ours.) He
urged that the very nature of our government was incompatible with
Blackstone's view. 7 However, judges in the early American cases
Digest of State Constitutions (Legis. Draft. Res. Columbia Univ. 1915) 700702. The following state cases have upheld the Blackstonian doctrine: Citizen's
Light H. & P. Co. v. Montgomery Light, 171 Fed. 553 (N. D. Ala. 1909);
Willis v. O'Connell, 231 Fed. 1004 (S. D. Ala. 1916); Dearborn Pub. Co. v.
Fitzgerald, 271 Fed. 479 (E. D. Ohio 1921); New York Juvenile Guardian
Society v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly 188 (N. Y. 1877) ; Star v. Brush, 185 App. Div.
261, 172 N. Y. Supp. 851 (2d Dept. 1918) ; Ulster Square Dealer v. Fowler,
58 Misc. 325, 111 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1908); Varnum v. Townsend's Adm'x, 21
Fla. 431 (1885); Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304 (1826); Howell
v. Bee Publishing Co., 100 Neb. 39, 158 N. W. 358 (1916); Respublica v.
Oswald, 1 Dal. 319 (Pa. 1788); Respublica v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 269 (Pa.
1805); Mitchell v. Grand Lodge, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 306, 121 S. W. 178
(1909) ; Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158 (1878).
2 See CHAFEE, FREEnOM OF SPEECH (1920) 8. "The time where legitimate
suppression begins is fixed chronologically at the time of publication. The
government cannot interfere by a censorship or injunction before the words
are spoken or printed, but can punish them as much as it pleases after publication, no matter how harmless or essential to the public welfare the discussion
may be."

'Lord Mansfield, in King v. Dean of St. Asoph, 3 T. R. 428, 431 (1784),
approved Blackstone's view, saying: "The liberty of the press consists in
printing without any previous license, subject to the consequence of law."
' See Walsh, Is the New Judicial and Legislative Interpretationof Freedom
of Speech and of the Freedom of the Press, Sound Constitutional Developmentt (1933) 21 Gao. L. 3. 162 et seq.; also, Near v. Minn., 283 U. S. 697,
51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233,
56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936).
' This view developed the law of seditious libel. See CHAFEE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 20, 21. "There was no need to prove any intention on the part of the
defendant to produce disaffection or excite an insurrection. It was enough if
he intended to publish the blame, because it was unlawful in him merely to
find fault with his masters and betters." Also, Madison, Report on the Virginia
Resolutions, 1799, 4 Ell. Deb. (2d) 596 et seq.; 9 SCHOFIELD, PUBLICATONS OF
Am. SOCIAL. Soc. (1914) 70 et seq.
'6 WRITIaS OF JAMES MADISON (Hunt ed. 1901) 386.
Madison placed his explanation of the First Amendment on the "essential
difference between the British Government and the American Constitution." In
England, he pointed out, it was necessary to guard against royal prerogative
only; but, in the United States, the legislature as well as the executive is under
limitations of power. Therefore, "the effective security of the press requires
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tended to adopt the common law definition.8 Writers of early texts
on the Constitution likewise followed the lead of Blackstone, and
asserted that all freedom of the press meant was freedom from previous restraint.9
Nor are the recent cases entirely free from Blackstone's influence.
In Pattersonv. Colorado,10 where the court held that the main purpose of the free speech and free press provision was to prevent previous restraint, and not to prevent subsequent punishment for abuse
considered contrary to public welfare, Justice Holmes stated: "The
main purpose of such constitutional provisions (freedom of speech
and of the press) is 'to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other governments', and they do
not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare." " "The Blackstonian theory dies
hard", 12 and thus we find that the decision in the Near v. Minnesota
case 13 is called "a resurgence of the eighteenth century doctrine of
the privilege of free speech." 14 This case ruled that the statute
widely known as the Minnesota Gag Law 15 is, in part, a previous restraint and, as a result, an encroachment upon freedom of the press
that it should be exempt not only from previous restraint by the executive as
in England, but from legislative restraint also through subsequent penalty of
laws." Madison, op. cit. supra note 5; see SPEECHES OF CHARLES PINCKNEY
(1800) 116 et seq.
' See cases cited in note 1. For an excellent criticism of these cases see
CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21 et seq. Cf. Corwin, Freedom of Speech
and Press Under the First Amendment (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 48.
12 KENT COMM. (1867 ed.) 17 et seq.; RAWLE, CONSTITUTION, C. 10.
*205 U. S.454, 27 Sup. Ct. 556 (1907).
"Justice Holmes subsequently modified this view in Schenck v. United
States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919), and in Abrams v. United States,
250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919). In the Schenck case, he said: "It may
well be that the prohibitions of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not
confined to previous restraints * * * "
' CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8.
" 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
(1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1148.
1MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 10, 123-1 to § 10, 123-3. Section 1
reads :
"Any person, who, as an individual, or as a member or employee of a
firm, or association or organization, or as an officer, director, member or
employee of a corporation, shall be engaged in the business of regularly
or customarily producing, publishing or circulating, having in possession,
selling or giving away,
(a) an obscene, lewd and lascivious newspaper, magazine or other
periodical, or
(b) a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine
or other periodical,
is guilty of a nuisance and all persons guilty of such nuisance may be
enjoined as hereafter provided * * *"
"Note
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as protected from state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 In
the course of its opinion, the majority sets forth "that liberty of the
press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally, although not exclusively, immunity
from previous restraints or censorship"."a
But the men who wrote the First Amendment must have meant
17
more by "freedom of the press" than the absence of censorship.
The expiration of the Licensing Act's in England removed the
menace of previous restraint by censorship forever in that country.
It follows then that it was not the evil of censorship by licensing
that the framers had uppermost in their minds. Highly pertinent
evidence of the meaning of the First Amendment is the reason set
forth by the Maryland Convention of 1788 for including the freedom of the press clause in the Bill of Rights.19 "In prosecutions
in the federal courts, for libels, the constitutional preservation of
this great and fundamental right may prove invaluable." (Italics
ours.) The Blackstonian doctrine affords no defense against subsequent punishment through libel prosecutions.2 0 Therefore, one
must concur with Professor Chafee's belief that the statement of the
Maryland Convention is "absolutely inconsistent with any Black" Gitlow v. New York, 268
v. California, 274 U. S. 357,
Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 382, 47
283 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532

U. S. 652, 666, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925) ; Whitney
362, 373, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927); Fiske v.
Sup. Ct. 655 (1927); Stromberg v. California,
(1931) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707,

51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
i a283 U. S. 697, 716, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
" See MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1860) c. 21; DUNIWAY, FREEDoM
OF SPEECH IN MASSACHUSETTS (1906) 89n.
'" 13 & 14 CAR II c. 33 (1661) ; see 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIoNs
(8th ed. 1927) 880; DUNIWAY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS
(1906) cc. I, II; 3 HALLAM, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1827)
445; 6 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1924) 360; LOLME, THE
CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND (1793) c. XII; 4 MADISON, LTTERS AND OTHER
WRr INGS (1865) 542; 2 MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1863)
104; PATERSON, LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, SPEECH AND PUBLIC WORSHIP (1880)
C. III; STORY, CONST. (5th ed. 1905) § 1882.
2 ELL. DES. (2d ed. 1835) 511. See PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, ed. McMaster and Stone, 151, 181. Here the possibility of an
excessive stamp tax--obviously not a "previous restraint"---of the type that had
been passed in Massachusetts was suggested. Sutherland, J., in Grosjean v.

Am. Press, 297 U. S. 233, 248, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936), "In 1785, only four years
before Congress had proposed the First Amendment, the Massachusetts legislature, following the English example, imposed a stamp tax on all papers and
magazines. Both taxes met with such violent opposition that the former was
repealed in 1786 and the latter in 1788." See also DUNIWAY, op. cit. mtpra note

17, at 136, 137.
Opposition newspapers had been crushed by a stamp duty in England.

See MAY, op. cit. supra note 18, at 108; 10 Anne c. 19, § 101, 118 (1711).

'See Note (1902) 16 HARV. L. REV. 56. "* * * there were reported in
Howell's State trials alone fifty-three cases of libel and 'seditious words' during
the eighteenth century * * * This trend of affairs in England Americans must
have seen with concern, and it seems a fair conclusion, therefore, that our
forbears meant by the constitutional guarantee to preserve freedom of public
discussion, and not merely freedom from censorship."
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stonian limitation of the right to absence of a censorship". 21 Moreover, Professor Chafee points out the intolerable paradox involved
in the common law position. 22 "In some respects this theory goes
too far in restricting state action. The prohibition of previous restraint would not allow a government to prevent a newspaper from
publishing the sailing dates of transports or the number of troops
m a sector.
"On the other hand, it is hardly necessary to argue that the
Blackstonian definition gives very inadequate protection to the freedom of expression. A death penalty for writing about socialism
would be as efficient suppression as a censorship."
Professor Chafee has pleaded that the Blackstonian theory ought
"to be knocked on the head once for all". 23 It would seem that the
Supreme Court in the case of Grosjean v. American Press Co.2 4 has
done just that. There, Justice Sutherland said: "It is impossible to
concede that by the words 'freedom of the press' the framers of the
amendment intended to adopt merely the narrow view then reflected
by the law of England that such freedom consisted only in immunity
from previous censorship, for this abuse had then permanently dis-

appeared from English practice." 25 Then, approving 2 6 as the test
to be applied the following statement by Judge Cooley,2 Justice
Sutherland attenuates the Blackstonian doctrine: "The evils to be
prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action
of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and
general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to
preparethe people for an intelligent exercise of their rightsas citizens."

(Italics ours.)
II.
It seems clear then that the protection afforded to the press by the
First Amendment goes beyond the absence of previous restraint and
extends to any action of the government that might hinder the "free
and general discussion of public matters." 28 And there can be no
surer method of curtailing the freedom of the press-as the framers of
the First Amendment envisioned it-than by preventing the distribution and circulation of matter after it has been published. As a select
committee of the Senate, under the chairmanship of Senator Calhoun,
'

CHAFEE, op. cit. sapra note 2, at 19.
CnAFEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 10.
CHAFm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 8.

a297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936).
'Id. at 248.
Id. at 249.
- COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 18, at 886.
"Ibid.
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clearly analyzed the nexus between circulation and freedom of the
press: 29
"The object of publishing is circulation and to prohibit
circulation is, in effect, to prohibit publication * * * and the
prohibition of one may as effectually suppress such communication as the prohibition of the other, and, of course, would as
effectually interfere with the freedom of the press, and be
equally unconstitutional * * *"
Or as Justice Field succinctly stated in Ex parte Jackson: 30
"Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom [of the press]
as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value."
How, then, have these essential elements-circulation and distribution-fared? In seeking an answer, we shall consider two aspects: (1) the more extensive method of circulation by mails, and
(2) distribution by hand, somewhat less important from the viewpoint of coverage, but no less important from the viewpoint of constitutional liberty.
Circulation by Mail.

While it is undoubtedly true that "the liberty of the press is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals," 31 it is likewise true that today these are the chief molders of public opinion, and the very bulwarks of protection in a democratic society.3 2 And since a medium
of inexpensive circulation is the very lifeblood of newspapers and
periodicals, the power to exclude them from the second-class mailing
privilege constitutes the power to crush them.S "From these reSEN. REp. No. 118, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836) 3.
"96 U. S. 727, 733 (1878).
"Chief Justice Hughes in Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup.

Ct. 666, 669 (1938).

and periodicals.

"The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers

It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed

have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of

Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest. The press in
its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a
vehicle of, information and opinion."
"Sutherland, J., in Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250,
56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936). "The newspapers, magazines and other journals of
the country, it is safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on
the public and business affairs of the nation than any other instrumentality * * * "
Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails (1938) 36 MIcH. L.
REv. 703, 732. "One must remember also that, in the course of time, the
mails became strengthened in their position as the only practical modern method
of inexpensive circulation to a large part of the reading public, entitled, under
the First Amendment, to information disseminated without restriction by undue
governmental burdens." Chief Justice White in Lewis Publishing Co. v.
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marks, it must be apparent that to prohibit publications on one side,
and circulation through the mails on the other of any paper on account
of its religious, moral, or political character * * * is equally an
abridgement of the freedom of the press, and a violation of the
constitution." 34

In 1878, the case of Ex parte Jackson,3 5 the first adjudication
concerning the postal power as an element in freedom of the press,
and the foundation upon which later cases rest, was decided. In the
course of its opinion, the court points out: (1) that Congress has the
right to determine the physical characteristics of the matter to be
mailed, (2) that exclusion from the mails does not bar the use of
other means of transportation; therefore, we are left to imply, such
exclusion is not a lethal blow to freedom of the press. But this decision has been rightly criticized in this manner: "The justification
for exclusion, if one exists, must be based on the Congressional power
to prohibit circulation of matter injurious to the public welfare and not
on a discretion of Congress 'to refuse its facilities for distribution'." 36
In 1890, Congress passed a bill 3 7-- which had, incidentally, failed
twice before 3 -- to close the mails to newspapers and periodicals
printing lottery information and advertisements.3 9 The cases of In re
Rapier and In re Dupre 4o were criminal actions brought under the
statute against two publishers for mailing newspapers announcing and
advertising the lottery of Louisiana. The defense of unconstitutionality was set up under the First Amendment. The court, basing its
decision 41 upon Ex parte Jackson,42 ruled that the First Amendment
did not prevent Congress from exercising its power to regulate the
mails. Thus the court sanctioned the censorship of the morals of a
Morgan, 229 U. S. 288, 304, 33 Sup. Ct. 867 (1913), "* * * the rate for first
class or letter mail [produces] a profit of seventy millions a year * * *
while for the second class or newspaper class the rates are such as to
entail a loss of seventy millions each year." He points out that the letter rate
is eighty times higher than that given newspapers under the second-class
privilege. See Report of the Commission on Second-class Mail Matter, H. R.
Doc. No. 559, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) 56, for history of mailing privileges
with relation to the press.
1SEN. REP. No.-l18, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (1836) 3.
n96 U. S.727 (1878).
: Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails (1938) 36 MIcH. L.
REv. 703, 733.
126 STAT. 465, §1 (1890), 18 U. S. C. §336 (1935).
'See H. R. REP. No. 2678, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886) ; H. R. REP. No.
787, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888).
' This bill was aimed particularly at the widespread lottery activity in
Louisiana "which stands almost alone in her toleration of the evil." See SEN.
REP. No. 11, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886) 11.
,0143 U. S.110, 12 Sup. Ct. 374 (1892).
"Decision criticized by H. Taylor in 155 North American Review 694
(Dec. 1892).
4296 U. S. 727 (1878).
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state 43 in the highly questionable
44 manner of closing the mails to publications deemed objectionable.
By the time the Supreme Court came to consider the case of
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan 4 5 -arising under the amendment of
the postal laws in 1912, which extended requirements concerning statements of circulation, ownership and indebtedness to newspapers and
periodicals availing themselves of the second-class mailing privilege 40
-it could say these new requirements were "concerned solely and
exclusively with the right on behalf of the publishers to continue to
enjoy great privileges and advantages at the public expense".4
This doctrine that the second-class mailing privilege-so utterly
essential to the circulation of a free press-was a "favor" found support in the famous case of United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson.48 The second-class mailing
privileges of the "Milwaukee Leader" had been revoked by Postmaster General Burleson on the grounds that it had repeatedly violated the Espionage Act,49 which closed the mails to publications
printing articles that were considered an obstruction to a successful
termination of the war. 0 The publisher challenged the validity of
the statute on the ground that it was "destructive of the rights of a
free press". 51
Although acknowledging the fact that the history of the First
Amendment justified the low second-class mailing privileges as a
means of "disseminating current intelligence" in an inexpensive manner, Justice Clarke, writing for the majority, persisted in following the
'" See Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and the Mail (1938) 36 MIcH. L.
REv. 703, 707; Weker, The Power to Exclude from the Mails (1930) 10
BosT. UNIv. L. REv. 346; Cushman, National Police Power Under the Postal
Clause of the Constitution (1920) 4 MINN. L. REv. 402; Rogers, The Extension
of the Federal Control Through the Regulation of the Mails (1913) 27 HARv.
L. REv. 27; Schroeder, On the Implied Power to Exclude "Obscene Ideas" from
the Mail (1907) 65 CENT. L. J. 177.
"See Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mail (1938) 36 MIcH. L.
REv. 703, 736.
' 229 U. S. 288, 33 Sup. Ct. 867 (1913).
Is37 STAT. 539, §2 (1912), 39 U. S. C. §233 (1935).
' Chief Justice White in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288,
316, 33 Sup. Ct. 867 (1913).
Is255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. 352 (1921).
Is CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 106. "In truth, the passage of the simple
language of the Espionage Act of 1917 was little as we thought it at the time
the deadliest blow ever struck at a free press in the United States."
' See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
1 See CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 107.
"After Mr. Burleson had
suppressed the August number of the Masses, he refused to admit the September or any future issues to the second-class mailing privilege, even if

absolutely free from any objectionable passages, on the ground that since the
magazine had skipped a number, viz., the July number, it was no longer a
periodical, since it was not regularly issued l He took the same position as to
Berger's Milwaukee Leader, and in both instances the courts sustained him,
thus confirming his right to drive a newspaper or magazine out of existence
for one violation as determined by him."
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questionable statement made in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan.52
He spoke of second-class mailing privileges as "a frank extension of
special favors to publishers", 53 as though the First Amendment were
written primarily for the pecuniary profit of a few instead of for the
intellectual growth of a nation! 54
The danger to our democratic conceptions of a free press inherent in the doctrines being established by the preceding decisionswas not unseen by all the men on the Supreme Court bench. It was
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Schaefer v. United States,5 who
wrote that the liberty of the press was "already seriously curtailed in
practice under powers assumed to have been conferred upon postal
authorities." And in his masterly dissent in Milwaukee Publishing
Co. v. Morgan,---concurred in by Mr. Justice Holmes, who in spite
of his decision in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, had now been
converted to the view that a general exclusion from the mails was a
menace to the First Amendment 56 --Justice Brandeis touches upon
the very crux of the instant discussion in this excellent fashion: "
"It is argued that, although a newspaper is barred from the
second-class mail, liberty of circulation is not denied, because the first
and third-class mail and also other means of transportation are left
open to a publisher. Constitutional rights should not be frittered
away by arguments so technical and unsubstantial * * *."

Thus,

"* * * to carry newspapers generally at a sixth of the cost of the service, and to deny that service to one paper of the same general character, because to the Postmaster General views therein expressed in
the past seem illegal, would prove an effective censorship, and abridge
seriously the freedom of expression.
"The contention that, because the rates are noncompensatory, use
of the second-class mail is not a right but a privilege which may be
granted or withheld at the pleasure of Congress, rests upon an entire
misconception, when applied to individual members of a class. The
fact that it is largely gratuitous makes clearer its position as a right;
for it is paid for by taxation." s
See note 47, supra.
United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 410, 41 Sup. Ct. 352 (1921).
'Note (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 1149, 1152. "The Supreme Court decisions
seem to hold the power of Congress to impose conditions upon use of the
mails, particularly the second-class privilege, to transcend the guaranty of the
First Amendment." See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.727 (1878) ; In re Rapier,
143 U. S. 110, 12 Sup. Ct. 374 (1892); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194
U. S.497, 24,Sup. Ct. 789 (1904); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S.
288, 33 Sup. Ct 867 (1913). See Rogers, Federal Interference with the
Freedom of the Press (1913) 23 YALE L. J. 559.
1'251 U. S.466, 40 Sup. Ct. 259 (1920).
14See Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 436, 41 Sup.
Ct. 352 (1921).
" Id. at 430, 431, 433.
'See Leach v. Carlisle, 268 U. S. 138, 45 Sup. Ct. 424 (1922>, whbre
Mr. Justice Holmes in a fine dissenting opinion shows his complete acceptance
'
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Unhappily, this was the dissenting opinion, but its inherent logic
was not to be without weight in future judicial considerations of the
question. In recent years, two significant decisions have come down
from the Supreme Court that, indirectly, nourish the hope that the
voices of Justice Holmes and Brandeis were not cries wasted on the
desert air. In 1936, the Supreme Court, by unanimous decision, in
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 59 held that a state statute imposing
a license tax on gross receipts for the privilege of publishing a newspaper, magazine, periodical or publication of more than a stated number of copies per week, is invalid as a violation of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which extended the guaranty
of a free press to state action. The court pointed out that the First
Amendment was intended to check "any form of previous restraint
upon printed publications or their circulations." 60 If taxes of the
nature condemned here invade a constitutional right, how much
greater an invasion occurs with the denial of the second-class mailing
privilege to a publication-a privilege made possible by general taxation of the people, justified by their desire for a free press? 61
"It is hoped and believed that the effect of Grosjean v.
American Press Co. will be to solidify into authoritative decision, at some early propitious occasion, the historical data,
the early scattered dicta and the recent strong dissents, to the
effect that abridgement of the use of the mails or of the secondclass mailing privilege is abridgement of a free press." 62
That the Grosjean case will exert a great influence in future pronouncements of the highest court in cases involving distribution and
circulation is already placed beyond peradventure by the court's latest
decision in a case of that type. In Lovell v. City of Griffin,63 Chief
Justice Hughes, in stressing the importance of distribution to a free
press and in the course of ruling a city ordinance restricting distribution unconstitutional, significantly notes that: "The license tax on
Grosjean v. American Press Co. was held invalid because of its direct
tendency to restrict circulation." 64
Distribution by Hand.

Cases involving restrictions on the distribution of newspapers,
circulars, and pamphlets on the city streets normally arise because of
of the principle that an abridgement of the use of the mails strikes at the
freedom of speech and of the press.
' 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936).
01Id. at 249.
' See Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails (1938) 36 MicH.
L. REV. 703, 751.
Ibid.
'303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938). For a discussion of this case see
(1938) 13 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 141.

SId. at 669.
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alleged violations of municipal ordinances. These ordinances are put
on the statute books largely to prevent having city streets littered with
commercial advertising broadsides. 65 But, commendable as this purpose is, local authorities have at times misused these laws in such
manner as to menace a constitutional right. Fortunately, a vigilant
judiciary has been quick to detect and to censure these encroachments
on a free press.
The New York case of People v. Johnson, et al., 60 well illustrates
the point made in the preceding paragraph. There the defendants
were charged with the violation of an ordinance 67 designed to limit
the promiscuous scattering of commercial and business matter. Actually, however, the defendants were passing out circulars entitled "Stop
the Ku Klux Klan Propaganda in New York" in front of a theatre
displaying a film which they believed was a factor in causing prejudice
and animosity against certain races and religions. Therefore, they
were protesting in a manner guaranteed by the Constitution of the
State of New York. 68 The court, dismissing the complaint, held that
no city ordinance could be allowed a construction that violated a fundamental constitutional right. "It would be a dangerous and unAmerican thing to sustain an interpretation of a city ordinance which
would prohibit the free distribution by a body of citizens of a pamphlet setting forth their views against what they believe to be a movement subversive of their rights as citizens." 69
Another type of municipal ordinance which threatens the press
is the one condemned by the Supreme Court in Lovell v. City of
Griffin.7" The ordinance 71 forbade the distribution in Griffin, Georgia,
"of circulars, handbooks, advertising or literature of any kind," without a permit from the City Manager. The defendant was convicted
of distributing a religious tract without procuring the required permission. Among other defenses, the defendant argued that the statute
was unconstitutional as violating the freedom of the press. After
' A good example of this type of ordinance is N. Y. C. CoDE op ORDiirANCES, c. 22, art. 2, § 15 (1914), which reads: "No person shall throw, cast or
distribute, or cause to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card
or other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place,
or in any front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any
hall of any building, or in a letterbox therein; provided that nothing herein
contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any
such matter by the postal service."
117 Misc. 133, 191 N. Y. Supp. 750 (1921).
See note 65, supra.
N. Y. CONsT. art. I, § 8, reading: "Every citizen may freely speak, write
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of
that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech or of the press."
Talley, J., in People v. Johnson, 117 Misc. 133, 134, 191 N. Y. Supp.
750, 751 (1921). See Star v. Brush, 185 App. Div. 261, 172 N. Y. Supp. 851
(2d Dept. 1918) ; Ex parte Campbell, 64 Cal. App. 300, 221 Pac. 952 (1923);
Coughlin v. Sullivan, 100 N. J. L. 42 (1924).
:'303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938).
Id. at 667.
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pointing out that municipal ordinances adopted under state authority
are within the prohibitions of the First Amendment by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 72 Chief Justice Hughes, in a compelling,
cogent decision, held the ordinance invalid and unconstitutional on
its face.
Of transcending importance to the future of a free press, and
with utmost pertinency to the instant discussion, the court said: 73
"The ordinance is comprehensive with respect to the
method of distribution. It covers every sort of circulation
'either by hand or otherwise'. * * * The ordinance prohibits
the distribution of literature of any kind, at any time, at any
place, and in any manner without a permit from the city
manager.
"We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is
such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of
the press by subjecting it to license and censorship * * *."
The court finds that such legislation "would restore the system
of license and censorship in its baldest form".7 4 Such an unequivocal
recognition of the basic position distribution holds in a free press,
when enunciated by the highest court in the land, constitutes a propitious augury.7 4a A court that hands down the Lovell decision is not
apt to allow a further growth of an administrative censorship by closing the mails to newspapers and periodicals, since a censorship is as effectively detrimental to a true democracy, whether enforced by a
Postmaster General or a City Manager.
Raymond v. Chicago Union Tractor Co., 207 U. S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. 7
(1907); Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 33
Sup. Ct. 312 (1912); Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Akron, 240 U. S. 462,
36 Sup. Ct. 402 (1915).
'Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666, 669 (1938).
7 Ibid.
'a The salutary influence that both the Grosiean and Lovell cases tend,
and will tend, to exert in keeping the press free is strikingly illustrated by the
recent case of People v. Banks, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 41 (July 20, 1938). Here the
court, relying upon the Grosiean decision, and quoting copiously from the Lovell
case, held that Sections B36-90.0, B36-91.0 and B36-95.0 of Article 6 of the
Administrative Code of the City of New York, in so far as the provisions
thereof prohibited the sale of pamphlets on the public streets, without first
paying a license tax, are void and unconstitutional as infringing upon the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
City Magistrate Rothenberg, in course of his opinion, said: "* * * it is
clear that the imposition of a license fee or tax as a prerequisite to the sale of
pamphlets on the streets has a direct tendency to restrict circulation * * *. Free
circulation depends as much and, conceivably, more upon sale than upon free
distribution, considering the cost involved in the free distribution of literature.
Adequate circulation may only be rendered possible through sale defraying the
cost of production. * * * "

1938 ]

NOTES AND COiMENT
Conclusions.,

We have seen, then, that the First Amendment guarantees more
than "mere absence from previous restraints", and that its aegis extends to any governmental action that tends to shackle a free press.
We have observed that liberty of circulation is as essential as liberty
of publishing to a press that is to be kept "free" in more than name
alone; and that, in the past, our highest court has sometimes failed to
detect invasions upon the freedom of- circulation, especially in the
cases dealing with distribution by mail.
However, we have marked that the Supreme Court, as evidenced
by the Grosjean and Lovell cases, is no longer unaware of the dangerous trend of the past decisions. And that now, it would seem, the
court is fully cognizant of the precarious paradox involved in guaranteeing a free press with one hand, and fettering the circulation of its
fruits with the other. "And can the wisdom of this policy be doubted
by any who reflect that to the press alone, chequered as it is with
abuses, the world is indebted for all the triumphs which have been
gained by reason and humanity over error and oppression; who reflect that to the same beneficial source the United States owe much of
the lights which conducted them to the ranks of a free and independent nation, and which have improved their political system into a
shape so auspicious to their happiness ?" 75
LAWRENCE

JARETT.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN NEw YORK.

In the law of real property a restrictive covenant refers to an
agreement whereby an owner of some interest in land has agreed not
to use it in a particular way for the benefit of some other interest in
the same or related land. Properly speaking, the term "restrictive
covenant" should be limited to covenants running with the land,' but
so many courts 2 and writers 3 have used the word "covenant" when
' Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1799) 4 MADIsON's WORKS 544.
At common law a covenant was said to be synonymous to a contract under
seal. 2 TFFAxY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 388. Equitable restrictions,
on the other hand, required no such formality, any simple agreement, whether
or not in the language or form of a covenant being sufficient. Giddings, Restrictions Upon tie Use of Land (1891) 5 HARv. L. Rv. 274; Note (1928) 14
VA. L. Rav. 647.
' Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N. Y. 440 (1877) ; Korn v.
Campbell, 192 N. Y. 490, 85 N. E. 682 (1908); Neponsit Property Owners'
Association, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N. Y. 248, 15 N. E.

(2d) 793 (1938).
o EQuiTY JusPRuDENcE (4th ed. 1919) 3958 n.
14 Pom ov,

